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The body is our general medium for having a world.  
 (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 169) 
 
Abstract 
On the basis of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of body, the article analyses the intersubjective life-world and the time experienced 
by a body. The consciousness and duality of a body are revealed: a body simultaneously experiences the other and itself. The 
article discusses a unity of a physical body and an incarnate consciousness, which reveals itself in certain lifelike situation at each 
point in time, a sensual perception of which each time provides new knowledge and further opens up the world. The article shows 
that Merleau-Ponty brought a revolution of sensual perception in philosophy. He revealed that sensual perception consisted of 
various processes of consciousness associated with memory, imagination, feelings and other areas. It is assumed that the reason 
of the origin of time is the interaction of a subject with things. Analysis of time is a possibility to access to a concrete structure of 
subjectivity that represents a subject. Time has a transitional nature of movement through the difference between the past and the 
future in the present. 
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Introduction 
The theme of the body is being examined by various scientific disciplines, such as architecture, 
geometry, geology, medicine, etc., and it is also popular in various arts, such as photography, sculpture, 
performance art, dance, etc. Natural science investigates physical characteristics of the body: mass, size, 
speed and other parameters. In terms of medicine, the issue of a human body and its contact with the 
environment is relevant. 
Philosophy became interested in the body in ancient times and a wide range of interpretations were 
offered in each historical period. In ancient times the body was perceived as an object with a tangible 
form, and the idea of the body was treated as part of the immaterial world. Such a dualistic concept was 
applied to the analysis of a human phenomenon that consists of body and soul. 
Psychology distinguishes between the human ego (the set of internal experiences) and the body 
that belongs to the outside world. Phenomenology analyses the relationship between I and the other or 
one’s own and a stranger. Thus the body of a human being is perceived in various ways since 
scientists, doctors, anthropologists, artists and representatives of other professions show interest in it. 
In the New Age a dualistic concept of a human being was established by a French philosopher, 
mathematician and physicist René Descartes (1596-1650) who set a framework for modern subjectivism. 
He distinguished between two kinds of substances: tangible (corporeal) and intangible (thinking). The 
substances are described pursuant to the main character of each, which were identified by Descartes as: 
“extension in length, breadth, and depth, constitutes the nature of corporeal substance; and thought the 
nature of thinking substance.” (Descartes, 1901, p. 321). According to Descartes, these two substances are 
in a human being. 
Describing himself as a thing that thinks “I am a substance also, although I conceive that I am a thing 
that thinks and not one that is extended” (Descartes, 1911, p. 16, [Med. III]), Descartes proposes a 
substantial unity of body and soul of a human being while perceiving himself as “a being composed of 
mind and body” (Descartes, 1911, p. 29. [Med. VI]). A substantial unity of body and soul of a human 
being does not mean that the body and soul of a human being are the same, because, according to 
Descartes, his soul, which is the basis of himself, “is entirely and absolutely distinct from my body, and 
can exist without it” (Descartes, 1911, p. 27. [Med. VI]). Thus thinking, which, according to Descartes, is 
the essence of the soul, establishes the priority of the entity in the cognitive process and gives it 
precedence over the body.  
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) also expressed his views on the subject. In 1938, he presented a cycle 
of lectures The Age of the World Picture to the society of Freiburg and evaluated Descartes’ approach 
arguing that “With the interpretation of man as subiectum, Descartes created the metaphysical 
presupposition for future anthropology of every kind and tendency” (Heidegger, 2002, p. 75).  
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A slightly different interpretation of the issue of body and soul was suggested by Vasily Sesemann 
(1884-1963), a philosopher who moved to Lithuania in 1923 and took a position as professor at the 
University of Lithuania in Kaunas (since 1940 in Vilnius University). In 1933, in the article “Time, 
Culture, and Body”, he wrote that “the spirit subordinates the body overpowering it by the body itself, 
and only with the discipline of the body can it control its own potencies” (Sesemann, 1997, p. 602). As 
Lithuanian philosopher Dalius Jonkus (born in 1965) points out, “He [V. Sesemann – D. M. S] perceived 
the cultivation of the body as an integral part of a philosophical practice.” (Jonkus, 2015, p. 39). 
There are different opinions concerning Descartes’ anthropology. The dualistic approach of Descartes 
provoked criticism from Martin Buber (1878-1965), Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980), Maurice Merleau-
Ponty (1908-1961) and others. Lithuanian philosopher Arūnas Sverdiolas (born in 1949) notes that 
“Merleau-Ponty tries to overcome the paradoxical Descartes’ dualism in every way and demonstrate that 
consciousness is a spirit that is independent of the body and is not offhandedly housed in the body, and 
the one which is essentially incarnated is incarnate and corporeal consciousness.” (Sverdiolas, 2005, p. 9). 
The article focuses on Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of the body, because he opened up completely 
new areas of the existence of the body.  
The object of research: expression of the philosophy of body. 
The purpose of the research: to reveal insights of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of the body and open 
new areas of the existence of the body. 
The methods of the research: comparative analysis of philosophical literature, interpretation and 
phenomenological reflection. 
 
A human body in a lifworld  
Merleau-Ponty investigates a human body from the phenomenological perspective, i.e., the body is in 
a lifworld: “The body’s animation is not the assemblage or juxtaposition of its parts. Nor is it a question 
of a mind or spirit coming down from somewhere else into an automaton; this would still suppose that the 
body itself is without an inside and without a “self”. There is a human body when, between the seeing and 
the seen, between touching and the touched, between one eye and the other, between hand and hand, a 
blending of some sort takes place – when the spark is lit between sensing and sensible, lighting the fire 
that will not stop burning until some accident of the body will undo what no accident would have sufficed 
to do...” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 163-164). From the point of view of Merleau-Ponty, a living body 
belongs to the world and is a certain source of it. 
Having noted the works on a lifworld by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), Merleau-Ponty concludes 
that the existence, i.e., the way of presence of being in the world, is determined not by consciousness, but 
by human “corps propre”. “Consciousness is being-towards-the-thing through the intermediary of the 
body” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 159-160). In this case being is treated as a specific, live and corporeal 
consciousness or, in other words, incarnate and not thinking consciousness. By means of phenomenology 
Merleau-Ponty demonstrates the incarnation of consciousness, i.e., reveals the consciousness of the body.  
He defines the essence of consciousness as the existence of Ego, and the world as something the life 
of Ego is based on and not as something that is being thought of the world. The world is not exhaustive, 
therefore Ego does not have it at its disposal, but communicates with it. According to Husserl, Merleau-
Ponty acknowledges that “consciousness itself as a project of the world, meant for a world which it 
neither embraces nor possesses, but towards which it is perpetually directed—and the world as this pre-
objective individual whose imperious unity decrees what knowledge shall take as its goal” (Merleau-
Ponty, 1964, p. xx).  
Thus a living body, a unity of a physical body and an incarnate consciousness, reveals itself in certain 
lifelike situation at each point in time, a sensual perception of which each time provides new knowledge 
and further opens up the world. However, according to Merleau-Ponty, being part of the world and 
wanting to perceive it, we have to suspend ourselves, weaken the intentional threads so that the world 
would unfold to us as strange and paradoxical. 
According to Lithuanian ethnologist Giedrė Šmitienė (born in 1973), Merleau-Ponty brought a 
revolution of sensual perception in philosophy and revealed that “sensual perception is affected by an 
incarnate consciousness or conscious body and that sensual perception is a synthesis inseparable from 
memory, imagination and many other processes of consciousness” (Šmitienė, 2014, p. 18). Relating 
sensual perception with the investigation of the world, Merleau-Ponty argues that “Looking for the 
world’s essence is not looking for what it is as an idea once it has been reduced to a theme of discourse; it 
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is looking for what it is as a fact for us, before any thematization.” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. xvii). Unique 
world for every normal human being is “antepredicatively self-evident” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 149). 
Intersubjective relationship 
According to Merleau-Ponty, a living body allows one to get to know the intersubjective relationship: 
“my body which perceives the body of another, and discovers in that other body a miraculous 
prolongation of my own intentions, a familiar way of dealing with the world.” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 
412). In this way, a living body is an instrument of communication that helps us not only to know the 
nature and bodies, but also to get the opportunity to meet and interact with others.  
A human being is a body which is involved in the relationship with other bodies and as a result of 
these relationships a human being can make use of his body and become aware of not only natural, but 
also social environment as “a permanent field or dimension of existence” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 412). 
A connection with the social world, according to Merleau-Ponty, is closer than any express perception or 
any judgement, just as with the natural world. Merleau-Ponty suggests looking at the social world form 
the perspective of existence, since “we are in contact by the mere fact of existing, and which we carry 
about inseparably with us before any objectification” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 412). 
In a primordial way a living body masters sociability that exists before any cognition and only then 
performs the act of communication and discovers the world around it. Merleau-Ponty maintains that my 
body is a “meaningful core which behaves like a general function, and which nevertheless exists, and is 
susceptible to disease. In it we learn to know that union of essence and existence which we shall find 
again in perception generally.” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 170). In this way, a traditional separation of a 
subject and an object is abandoned by acknowledging that the intersubjective relationship unfolds in the 
environment of various realities in which separate things of the world disappear, as a human being and 
the world are the members of one body: “it is the same world that contains our bodies and our minds, 
provided that we understand by world not only the sum of things that fall or could fall under our eyes, but 
also the locus of their compossibility” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 13). 
Regarding the human communication and its process, Merleau-Ponty discerns the ability of people to 
articulate the world. For example, when listening to music we feel certain experiences associated with 
music, i.e., the thing itself gives us a way into the world of the other. Such a contact with the other 
includes the relationship both with oneself and the world and covers a wide range of experience: time, 
imagination, space, the other, feelings, patterns of behaviour, etc.  
Communication with the world is continuously ongoing, because the world is alive and the things 
within it constantly reveal themselves with a new desire of existence by including a thinking Ego into the 
event of life. Merleau-Ponty notes that this relationship obviously reveals itself in the painting works. 
Analysing the painting works of Cézanne, he emphasized that as regards the painter, “the world no longer 
stands before him through representation; rather, it is the painter to whom the things of the world give 
birth by a sort of concentration or coming-to-itself of the visible. Ultimately the painting relates to 
nothing at all among experienced things unless it is first of all “autofigurative”. It is a spectacle of 
something only by being a “spectacle of nothing”, by breaking the “skin of things” to show how the 
things become things, how the world becomes world.” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 312).  
In the art of painting the representation of things through the play of forms transforms a common 
understanding of the thing by giving it a deep sense and signifies the surrounding environment in a new 
way. Merleau-Ponty’s vision of artwork was a way “for being absent from myself, for being present at the 
fission of Being from the inside – the fission at whose termination, and not before, I come back to 
myself” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 317). Artwork as well as things of the nature exist in the visible, 
disclose a primordial expression of the reality and teach us how to see the true and deep beauty of the 
universe. 
Nature admiration presupposes not only the articulation of the world, but also actions in conjunction 
with the other, during which a human body experiences itself and the other in a primordial way. By way 
of example, Merleau-Ponty points to his and the other’s admiration in a green meadow: “Then, through 
the concordant operation of his body and my own, what I see passes into him, this individual green of the 
meadow under my eyes invades his vision without quitting my own, I recognize in my green his green.” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 142). In this case, as Merleau-Ponty points out, there is no problem of alter ego, 
since the seeing of greenness anonymously includes both observers, and its spreader, which is here and 
now, radiates greenness all the time. In this way, a non-corporeal being of the greenness is experienced. 
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Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that in this case, together with the visible and the tangible we face up “a 
presumptive domain of the visible and the tangible, which extends further than the things I touch and see 
at present” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 143). Thus the intersubjective relationship includes the action of 
touch. While touching not only the data are being received, but also the duality of the body is 
experienced: the body becomes something that experiences things and something that is being 
experienced. Merleau-Ponty describes such a body that generates the exchange of information between 
something that is being experienced and something that experiences things as a dynamic and transitive 
body intentionally directed towards the other. 
Lithuanian phenomenologist Dalius Jonkus (born in 1965) points out that Merleau-Ponty does not put 
visuality and tactility against each other and reveals that “visuality, albeit indirectly, is localised in 
corporeality and experienced as a an inter-corporeal relation” (Jonkus, 2009, p. 210). Such a concept of a 
dual body of Merleau-Ponty reveals polycentricity of the world. 
 
Body and time 
In the polycentric field thanks to consciousness a body unfolds in time that measures our being. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, time makes sense to us “because we are at the past, present and future. It is 
literally the tenor [sens] of our life, and, like the world, is accessible only to the person who has his place 
within it, and who follows its direction” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 500). Time helps to understand the 
presence of an object and a subject, as two abstract modi, in the integral structure called presence. 
Merleau-Ponty argues that a perception of being in the time dimension allows one to get to know the 
relationship between a subject and the world, because it develops through time-subject and time-object. 
Analysis of time is a possibility to access to a concrete structure of subjectivity that represents a subject. 
Merleau-Ponty discovers an intimate relation between subjectivity and time: “To analyse time is not 
to follow out the consequences of a pre-established conception of subjectivity, it is to gain access, through 
time, to its concrete structure. If we succeed in understanding the subject, it will not be in its pure form, 
but by seeking it at the intersection of its dimensions. We need, therefore, to consider time itself, and it is 
by following through its internal dialectic that we shall be led to revise our idea of the subject.” (Merleau-
Ponty, 1962, p. 477).  
As a sequence of events, time presents an environment that a subject can understand only by taking a 
certain position in it, which makes this environment tangible to him. Being the core of time, the world 
exists thanks to the sole motion of time, which combines and separates the actually presented and the 
present. Consciousness, which is to bring clarity, on the contrary, becomes a carrier of ambiguity. In this 
way, according to Merleau-Ponty, nothing exists outside time, but “temporality is not some half-hearted 
existence” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 387). A thing and the world only exist at a level in which subjects 
experience them.  
An object and the world are mysterious to us and are no longer a part of an objective thinking due to 
ambiguities, i.e., invisible sides of a thing or their inaccessible internal parts as well as the present of a 
thing that emerged from the past and already has a vision of the future. Merleau-Ponty argues that the 
ideal of an objective thinking is based upon and ruined by temporality, thus, according to him, “the world 
itself lives outside me, just as absent landscapes live on beyond my visual field, and as my past was 
formerly lived on the earlier side of my present.” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 389).  
According to Merleau-Ponty, time originates due to the subject’s interaction with things. The very 
things contain the future and the past as if of eternal state of pre-existence and survival. The future and 
the past existing in the present of the world are considered to be a surplus, since for being to be time-
based, it lacks non-existence. An objective world is full of everything, therefore there is no place for time: 
“Past and future withdraw of their own accord from being and move over into subjectivity in search, not 
of some real support, but, on the contrary, of a possibility of not-being which accords with their nature.” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 479).  
If future prospects were withdrawn from an objective world and the latter was perceived as being 
inside oneself, we would have only “now”. However, Merleau-Ponty notes that these “now” would not be 
able to form a sequence as they do not belong to anything and do note have any features of temporality. 
Thus, it is wrong to define time as a sequence of “now”. Time is a datum of consciousness, i.e., 
consciousness constitutes time and becomes independent from “now”.  
Indeed constituted time is not time, but its final registration and the result of its movement that 
“objective thinking always presupposes yet never manages to fasten on to” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 
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482). Such a time as if becomes spatial in nature, because its individual moments exist even before 
thinking and belong to the present, since “consciousness is contemporary with all times” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962, p. 482). 
This is a static and unchanging space for a particular subject, therefore, Merleau-Ponty argues that 
there should be another time, i.e., real time that goes on in its own way. It is important for us to see the 
birth of this time and conceive its expression not as the object of our knowledge, but as a dimension of 
our being. It is in daily activities of a person that time expresses itself with a day that is about to end in 
the horizon of an evening and an approaching night. The past, as if a day that is about to end, regenerates 
itself with the time lived out and is opened up when we return to the past moments which were then 
closed to the future of this day. This indicates that time is measured by means of a personal life, attesting 
to “a future sliding into the present and on into the past” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 483). 
In this way time is perceived intentionally. The past, the present and the future overlap with each 
other and are experienced in the present, which is not identical to itself. We can perceive the present from 
a certain distance, i.e., through the difference between the past and the future as well as through a 
corporeal transcendence of the motion. The solution to transcendental problems lies “in the thickness of 
the pre-objective present, in which we find our bodily being, our social being, and the pre-existence of the 
world” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 503). 
 
Conclusions 
While communicating with itself and the other, a human body unfolds in space and time experiencing 
the real world and its history. Phenomenology of body developed by Merleau-Ponty reveals a body that 
perceives things and analyses and interprets situations. Merleau-Ponty calls such actions the incarnation 
of consciousness and becoming of body a conscious subject. A body is the way of presence of a human 
being. 
From the point of view of Merleau-Ponty, a living body belongs to the world and is a certain source 
of it. A body experiences and is being experienced in conjunction with the world and, therefore, it is a 
correlate of the world. Communication with the world is continuously ongoing, because the world is alive 
and the things within it constantly reveal themselves with a new desire of existence by including a 
conscious subject into the event of life and an encounter with the other. During the encounter with the 
other, the fields of perception of both participants overlap, and this field becomes polycentric. Thus the 
unity of the world is developed by taking over each other’s experience. 
Time plays an important role in phenomenology of body. Merleau-Ponty attributes time to the 
network of intentionalities. Intentionality is a directiveness of consciousness towards an object, in other 
words, its states or experiences. Each experience, as an intentional act, is time-based and has a transitional 
nature of movement through the difference between the past and the future in the present. 
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KŪNO FILOSOFIJA: INTERSUBJEKTYVUMAS IR LAIKIŠKUMAS 
Dalia Marija Stančienė 
 
S a n t r a u k a 
Straipsnyje, remiantis Merleau-Ponty kūno filosofija, analizuojamas intersubjektyvus gyvenamasis pasaulis ir 
kūno išgyvenamas laikas. Filosofija kūnu susidomėjo antikoje ir visais istoriniais periodais yra siūlomos įvairios  
interpretacijos. Psichologijoje išskiriamas žmogaus ego (vidinių patirčių visuma) ir kūnas, priklausantis išoriniam 
pasauliui. Fenomenologai analizuoja Aš ir Kito arba savo ir svetimo santykį.  
Dualistinę žmogaus koncepciją Naujaisiais amžiais įtvirtino prancūzų  filosofas, matematikas ir fizikas René 
Descartes’as, nubrėžęs gaires moderniam subjektyvizmui. Jis išskyrė dvi substancijų rūšis: materialias (kūniškas) ir 
nematerialias (dvasines), kurios randasi žmoguje. Apibūdindamas save kaip mąstantį daiktą, Descartes teigia 
substancinę žmogaus kūno ir sielos vienovę. Žmogaus substancinė kūno ir sielos vienovė nereiškia jų tapatumo, nes 
siela daro jį tuo, kuo jis yra. Mąstymas yra sielos esmė, įtvirtina subjekto prioritetą pažinimo procese ir suteikia jam 
viršenybę nuosavo kūno atžvilgiu. 
Descartes antropologija vertinama įvairiai. Dėl dualistinio požiūrio Descartes susilaukė kritikos iš Martino 
Buberio, Jeano-Paulio Sartre'o, Maurice Merleau-Ponty ir kt. Straipsnyje pagrindinis dėmesys skiriamas Merleau-
Ponty kūno filosofijai, nes jis atvėrė visiškai naujas kūno egzistavimo erdves. Merleau-Ponty žmogaus kūną tiria iš 
fenomenologinės perspektyvos, t.y. kūnas randasi gyvenamajame pasaulyje. Jis teigia, kad ne sąmonė, o žmogaus 
„nuosavas kūnas“ apsprendžia egzistenciją t.y. jo būties buvimo būdą pasaulyje. Būtis traktuojama kaip konkreti, 
gyva, kūniška arba, kitaip tariant, ne mąstanti, o įsikūnijusi sąmonė. Fenomenologijos pagalba Merleau-Ponty 
parodo sąmonės įsikūnijimą, t. y. atskleidžia kūno sąmoningumą.  
Pasak G. Šmitienės, Merleau-Ponty įvykdė juslinio suvokimo perversmą filosofijoje, atskleisdamas kad 
jusliniame suvokime veikia įkūnyta sąmonė arba sąmoningas kūnas, kad juslinis suvokimas – tai sintezės, 
neatskiriamos nuo atminties, vaizduotės ir daugybės kitų sąmonės procesų.  
Gyvenamasis kūnas yra bendravimo instrumentas, kurio pagalba ne tik pažįstame gamtą ir kūnus, bet taip pat 
įgyjame galimybę susitikti ir bendrauti su kitais. Žmogus yra kūnas, kuris įtraukiamas į santykius su kitais kūnais ir 
šių santykių dėka žmogus įvaldo kūną ir pažįsta ne tik gamtinę, bet ir socialinę aplinką. Atsisakęs tradicinės 
subjekto ir objekto perskyros, Merleau-Ponty teigia, kad intersubjektyvūs santykiai skleidžiasi įvairių realijų 
susipynusioje terpėje, kurioje dingsta atskiri pasaulio dalykai, kadangi žmogus ir pasaulis yra vieno kūno nariai. 
Tirdamas žmonių komunikaciją, Merleau-Ponty jos vyksme įžvelgė žmonių gebėjimą artikuliuoti pasaulį. 
Komunikacija su pasauliu vyksta nenutrūkstamai, nes pasaulis yra gyvas, kuriame esantys daiktai nuolat atsiveria 
nauju egzistencijos geismu, įtraukdami mąstantį Ego į gyvenimo įvykį. Intersubjektyvūs santykiai suponuoja kūno 
dvilypumą: tuo pat metu kūnas patiria kitą ir save. Subjekto sąveika su pasauliu, pasak Merleau-Ponty, gimdo laiką. 
Laiko analizė – tai patekimas į konkrečią subjektyvybės, reprezentuojančios subjektą, struktūrą. Laikas 
priskiriamas intencionalumų tinklui. Intencionalumas – tai sąmonės nukreiptumas į objektą, t. y. jos būsenos arba 
išgyvenimai. Laikas turi pereinamąjį judėjimo pobūdį per praeities ir ateities skirtumą dabartyje.   
Merleau-Ponty kūno filosofija atskleidžia subjektiškumo sritį, kurioje reiškiasi tarpasmeniniai santykiai, jausmai, 
mąstymas, juslinės funkcijos, kalba, ir kt. Visa tai yra egzistencijos pagrindas, atsiveriantis žmogui gyvame 
kūniškame pasaulyje.  
 
 
